PARLEMENT & WETENSCHAP

# EU Trade Agreements with Africa: Barriers, Opportunities, and the Role of the Netherlands and the EU in African Market Access

3 November 2026 | Dr. Okey Ndubueze[1], Prof. Chibuike Uche[2]

## Abstract

For almost seventy years, Europe and Africa have been bound together by a series of trade arrangements, beginning with the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The European Union (EU) presents these arrangements as generous. Many African exports enter the European market without import duties, and many African countries receive duty-free, quota-free treatment through Everything But Arms (EBA), the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EU attributes Africa's continuing trade and development difficulties mainly to weak production capacity, limited infrastructure and shortcomings in national institutions, rather than to the European trade framework itself.

This paper argues that this explanation is incomplete. Market access must be judged by its effect on African production, not the tariff coverage alone. A legal right to enter a market is not the same as the ability to compete there, to process commodities at home, or to keep a fair share of the final value. The central issue is not simply whether African goods can enter Europe. It is which goods enter easily, which face obstacles, what happens when European goods enter African markets, and what freedom African governments retain to build their own economies within the partnership framework.

Drawing on primary literature and official statistics, this paper shows that the Africa-EU trade system has repeatedly encouraged Africa to export raw materials while making it harder to process them, build industries, and retain value. It answers four questions: what barriers African countries face in entering the European market; how those barriers can be removed; what opportunities exist; and what the EU and the Netherlands can do. It examines the barriers created by tariff structures, product classification, standards, rules of origin, and EPA policy restrictions. It illustrates them through four sectors: cocoa, dairy, poultry, and tomato paste. In the last three, subsidised or low-

[1] Dr Okey Ndubueze, a lecturer at the University of Applied Science Europe, Amsterdam, and a member of the Governance, Entrepreneurship and Inclusive Development Collaborative Research Group, African Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden.

[2] Prof. Dr Chibuike Uche is the chairholder of the Stephen Ellis Chair for the Governance of Finance and Integrity in Africa and the Chair, Governance, Entrepreneurship and Inclusive Development Collaborative Research Group, African Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden.

priced European exports have undermined African farmers and processors in their own markets, while African products face duties and certification barriers to enter Europe. The paper traces decades of consistent warnings from United Nations institutions, sets out the governance architecture that makes market-opening commitments binding while development promises remain discretionary, and closes with a concrete, negotiable agenda for aligning EU trade practice with its development objectives.

### Key messages;

- Africa sells Europe raw materials and buys back manufactured goods. In 2025, primary products made up 70.2% of Africa's goods exports to the EU, while manufactured goods made up 69.3% of EU exports to Africa.
- Duty-free access has not moved processing to Africa. Processed cocoa from Côte d'Ivoire enters the EU duty-free, yet the country supplies 40% of the world's cocoa and receives only 5–7% of the sector's global profit.
- The barriers that matter now are rules more than tariffs: product classification controlled by the EU, costly health and traceability requirements, restrictive rules of origin, and new laws such as the EUDR and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
- EPAs restrict the tools today's industrialised countries once used freely: export taxes, local-content rules, tariff increases and usable trade remedies.
- European exports have undermined African producers in their own markets. A milk powder the EU will not call milk dominates West African milk imports, EU poultry has been formally found to be dumped in South Africa, and Ghana now spends US$168 million a year on tomato imports.
- Market-opening commitments are legally binding; development promises are not. The greatest impediment to a mutually beneficial trade between the EU and Africa is widespread EU double standards.

This factsheet answers four questions: what barriers African countries face in entering the European market; how those barriers can be removed; what opportunities exist; and what the EU and the Netherlands can do. Section 1 presents the scale and the nature of the EU-Africa trade relationship. Section 2 examines the barriers created by tariff structures, product classification, standards, rules of origin, and EPA policy restrictions. Section 3 illustrates these barriers in concrete sectors: cocoa, dairy, poultry, and tomato paste. Section 4 reviews the governance of the EU-Africa trade relationships, and Section 5 closes with recommendations.

# 1. Introduction: The Scale and Nature of the EU–Africa Trade Relationship

## 1.1. Large flows, unequal structures

EU–Africa trade is large, but it is deeply unequal. In 2025, the EU imported €189.6 billion of goods from Africa and exported €166.3 billion of goods to Africa, giving a total goods trade of €355.9 billion (European Commission, 2026b). These figures cover goods only, not services or investment. The composition of trade matters even more than its value. Africa sells to the EU a basket dominated by primary products: they made up 70.2% of Africa’s goods exports to the EU in 2025, and fuels alone accounted for 40.6%. In the other direction, manufactured goods made up 69.3% of EU exports to Africa, with machinery and transport equipment alone accounting for 37.1% (European Commission, 2026b). Put simply, Africa mainly exports fuels, minerals, ores and agricultural commodities, often with little processing, into the EU. The EU exports machinery, chemicals, vehicles

and other manufactured or processed goods to Africa. African countries therefore tend to supply the lower-value stages of production, while European companies capture more value through processing, branding, technology, finance and retail.

The dependence is also one-sided. In 2025, 38.2% of Africa's exports to destinations outside Africa were to the EU, while only 6.3% of the EU's exports to destinations outside the EU were to Africa (European Commission, 2026b).

African economies depend far more on Europe as a buyer than Europe depends on Africa. This affects bargaining power: a country that relies heavily on one major market has less freedom to reject unfavourable rules or negotiate as an equal.

Preferential access has not changed this pattern enough. Export earnings alone do not reveal who owns the processing plants, controls the brands, supplies the technology or receives the profits. A trade surplus built on fuel can coexist with weak industry and constant exposure to external price shocks.

### 1.2. Commodity dependence remains the rule, not the exception

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines an economy as commodity-dependent when more than 60% of its merchandise export value comes from commodities. On that basis, 46 of Africa's 54 countries (85%) were commodity-dependent in 2021–2023 (UNCTAD, 2025b). UNCTAD warns that such dependence leaves countries exposed to volatile prices, external shocks, fiscal weakness, and delayed structural transformation. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) reports that Africa accounts for 3.2% of world gross domestic product (GDP) but only 2.0% of world manufacturing value added (UNIDO, 2024). Manufacturing value added is the value factories create after paying for their inputs. Africa's small share shows how little processing takes place on the continent.
The evidence points to a persistent structural problem. Trade has grown, and agreements have multiplied, but Africa's position in the international economy has not changed enough. The continent continues to export too many raw materials and import too many finished products. Preferential access has opened the European market in a formal sense, but it has not reliably enabled African countries to move up the value chain.

### 1.3. How African exporters formally access the EU market

There is no single EU trade regime for Africa. What an exporter pays and what it must prove depend on its country, its product, the agreement that applies, and its proof of origin.

- **Everything But Arms (EBA)** gives least developed countries duty-free, quota-free access for all products except arms and ammunition. "Duty-free" means no import tax; "quota-free" means no ceiling on quantity. Neither removes food-safety, origin, or other import conditions.
- **Standard GSP** reduces or removes duties on specified products from eligible developing countries.
- **GSP+** gives deeper preferences to vulnerable countries that ratify and implement international conventions (European Commission, n.d.-g).

The renewed GSP, adopted as Regulation (EU) 2026/1395, applies from 1 January 2027 for ten years, and EBA continues without an end date (European Commission, n.d.-g; Regulation (EU) 2026/1395, 2026). The rules are now adopted. The task for African governments and their allies is to monitor how graduation, safeguards and conditionality operate in practice during the 2027–2036 cycle.

EPAs are reciprocal agreements: both sides open their markets, although the EU generally opens faster and more fully while African partners liberalise more gradually and may exclude sensitive products. Qualifying products from Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire enter the EU duty-free and quota-free. Under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia receive broad duty-free access, while South Africa operates under a different schedule with product-specific limits (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016; European Commission, n.d.-c).

The EPAs are also being deepened. The EU–Kenya EPA entered into force on 1 July 2024 (European Commission, n.d.-f). Then, on 10 June 2026, the EU concluded negotiations on an enhanced EPA with Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles (ESA4). It extends well beyond goods into services, investment, digital trade, public procurement, intellectual property and sustainable development (European Commission, 2026c). Concluding negotiations does not mean the agreement is already in force, but the direction is clear. This new template brings in substantially more regulatory obligations for African partners, while the development cooperation attached to it, as in earlier agreements, remains cooperative rather than legally enforceable (see section 4).

Institutionally, the EU and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat signed a cooperation memorandum on 20 April 2026. It is backed by a €1.2 billion Team Europe Initiative of more than eighty actions supporting African economic integration, with the Netherlands among the participating funders (European External Action Service, 2026). Behind it sits Global Gateway's Africa–Europe package, an announced €150 billion that combines grants, loans, guarantees, and private capital (European Commission, n.d.-d). It is not €150 billion in grants already delivered. Its value will be measured by power reaching African factories, shorter border delays and new African processing capacity, not by the size of the announcement.

The growing EU interest in critical raw materials, such as cobalt, lithium, platinum, copper and rare earths, gives African governments leverage to attach local-processing commitments to supply partnerships. That leverage is real only if they are not simultaneously constrained by export-tax and local-content restrictions in their EPAs. This tension between the EU's raw-materials agenda and Africa's value-addition agenda is the sharpest unresolved contradiction in current EU policy towards Africa.

# 2. Existing Structural Barriers

### This section presents six important (sets of) structural barriers for African producers

## 2.1. Tariff structures still favour raw materials over processing

Tariff escalation occurs when import duties rise as a product becomes more processed. Raw cocoa beans, for example, may enter at zero duty while chocolate pays more. Escalation rewards the export of raw materials and penalises the factory that tries to process them at home.

This logic has deep roots. The Treaty of Rome instructed the European Community, when setting its common customs tariff, to take account of "the Community's requirements of supply in raw materials and semi-finished goods" (United Nations, 1957, art. 29c). From the start, the tariff system was designed to secure reliable, cheap access to inputs while protecting European producers of higher-value goods.

Preferences have since removed tariff escalation for some African exporters. For example, under EBA, most exports from least developed countries (LDCs) can enter the EU free of tariffs. This is, however, subject to rules of origin and health and safety regulations. Cocoa from Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, which are not LDCs, enter the EU market through the EPA route subject to the above qualifications (European Commission, 2022a). Even with the tariff wall removed, processed products made up only 46% of Ghana's cocoa exports to the EU and 42% of Côte d'Ivoire's in 2025 (European Commission, 2026d). When removing tariffs does not move processing to Africa, the barriers must lie elsewhere: in finance, energy costs, buyer power, standards and market structure.

Where preferences do not apply, escalation still bites. Nigeria, Africa's largest economy, has not signed the regional West Africa EPA and trades with the EU under standard GSP (GSP Hub, n.d.). Standard GSP offers only partial reductions on selected lines. For fat-filled milk powder (CN 1901 90 95), for example, the EU's standard duty is 7.6% plus an agricultural component, a milk-linked duty that depends on the product's milk fat and protein content. Nigeria's GSP rate is 4.1% plus the same component (European Commission, n.d.-h; rates as of October 2026). Within the EPAs themselves, South Africa's access remains subject to product-specific limits (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016). The EU should publish a country-by-product audit showing where processing penalties remain, and remove them.

## 2.2. The product classification system gives the EU additional control

Customs authorities classify every product using a numerical code. The EU's Combined Nomenclature (CN) builds on the international Harmonised System and determines which tariff applies. It is what distinguishes cocoa beans from cocoa paste, and cocoa paste from chocolate. The EU's Integrated Tariff of the European Union (TARIC) database brings together all the measures that apply to each code. In practice, traders must consult these EU systems rather than the treaty text to know what access they actually have.

The governance concern is that the CN is part of EU law, and the EU revises it every year. African governments negotiate the agreement, but the detailed product definitions that decide how it works day to day remain inside a legal and administrative system controlled by the EU. The fat-filled milk powder case shows this power at work. The EU created a dedicated code, CN 1901 90 95, in 2020 (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1776, 2019). It did so only after civil-society campaigns highlighted how little was known about the trade (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). The EU decides when a product becomes statistically visible and when it does not.

Some classification system is unavoidable, and nothing here suggests that annual revisions lawfully allow the EU to cancel negotiated concessions. The problem is dependence and uncertainty: African governments and firms must continuously monitor a technical European system to know what access they have, while changing the treaty itself requires slow joint decisions. Advance rulings, published tables linking old and new codes, and joint monitoring would reduce this imbalance.

## 2.3. Non-tariff barriers now restrict trade more than tariffs

Import duties are no longer the main obstacle facing African exporters. Increasingly, access depends on whether producers can prove compliance with detailed European rules on health, safety, environment and documentation.

**Health and safety rules.** Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules protect human, animal and plant health. They cover pesticide residues, aflatoxins, microbial contamination and similar risks. Animal-origin foods also require approval of the exporting country and of individual establishments (European Commission, n.d.-e). Large exporters can pay for laboratories, testing and certification;

smallholders and small businesses often cannot. A zero tariff does not help a producer who cannot prove compliance. Without accredited laboratories, traceability systems and recognised inspection services, duty-free access remains largely theoretical. The aim is not to lower health protection but to fund the public systems that make compliance possible.

**Rules of origin.** These rules decide whether a product counts as "made in" a partner country and therefore qualifies for preferential treatment. Cumulation rules decide whether inputs from other countries can count towards that status. EPA rules allow several forms of cumulation, but only where administrative cooperation and compatible origin rules are in place, and membership of AfCFTA does not guarantee that the EU will recognise African inputs (European Commission, n.d.-c). An African food processor that sources ingredients from neighbouring countries may lose its EU preference if those inputs fail the product-specific test. Rules designed in Brussels can therefore obstruct exactly the regional supply chains AfCFTA is meant to build.

**Environmental and due-diligence rules.** Three new European laws add a further layer of obligations, and each reaches back to African producers.

***EU Deforestation rules (EUDR).*** The EU Deforestation Regulation's main obligations apply from 30 December 2026 to large and medium operators, and from 30 June 2027 to most micro and small operators (European Commission, n.d.-i). Cocoa, coffee and timber supply chains must prove, with geolocation and traceability data, that products are deforestation-free. The formal obligations fall on EU operators, but the information burden reaches back to African smallholders, many of whom sell through informal chains without the data systems these rules require.

***Carbon border tax (CBAM).*** The definitive regime of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism began on 1 January 2026. It covers iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, and the first certificate surrender falls due on 30 September 2027 (European Commission, 2026a, n.d.-a). Modelling by the African Climate Foundation and the London School of Economics finds that Africa would be hit harder, as a share of GDP, than any other region, because the EU is a key market for these goods and African production is relatively carbon-intensive. The same report notes that the EU considered an exemption for least developed countries but dropped it, and directed CBAM revenues to its own Innovation Fund rather than to decarbonisation in the poorest countries (African Climate Foundation & LSE, 2023).

***Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).*** Following the 2026 amendments, the main company obligations of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive apply from 26 July 2029, and its scope now centres on very large companies (European Commission, n.d.-b). Narrowing the legal scope does not remove the burden. Large buyers can still push equivalent requirements down to African suppliers through private contracts, which are less transparent, less negotiable and less subject to public oversight.

The overall effect is clear. African exporters face a rising compliance burden that falls hardest on the smallest producers. Standards may serve legitimate purposes, but without matching support they function as barriers to trade, and the risk is that buyers drop smallholders rather than invest in them.

## 2.4. EPAs restrict the policy tools needed for industrialisation

EPAs do not merely open European markets. They also limit the policies African governments can use to build industries and escape commodity dependence. "Policy space" means the freedom

governments have to support their own productive development. The SADC EPA shows how this works in practice.

**Export taxes.** A government might tax raw cocoa beans or unprocessed minerals as they leave the country, to encourage processing at home. Every country that industrialised used tools like this. Article 26 of the SADC EPA generally prohibits new or increased export taxes on trade with the EU. Its industrial-development exception allows such taxes on no more than eight products at a time, for no more than twelve years, at a maximum rate of 10%, and with protected export volumes for the EU (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 26). These flexibilities exist, but they are tightly fenced. They are not a free hand to steer how a country's resources leave its borders.

**Local-content rules.** Governments often require companies to source a share of their inputs locally, or to process locally, in order to develop suppliers and transfer technology. Article 40(4) restricts specified requirements of this kind (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 40). It does not ban all local employment, training or supplier support, and some limits also stem from WTO rules. But it narrows a tool that today's industrialised economies use freely.

**Tariff standstill.** Article 23 prevents new or increased duties on liberalised products, except those placed in the excluded category (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 23). Once a tariff is cut, restoring it becomes very difficult. The dairy case in Section 3.2 shows the consequence: under their EPAs, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire have fully liberalised imported milk powders for processing, so any regional move to raise the West African tariff on these powders would require renegotiating their EPAs (Levard & Corniaux, 2024).

**Most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses.** These can entitle the EU to any better treatment an African country gives to another major trading economy. Under the SADC EPA's Article 28, agreements with other African and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are exempt, so the clause does not block AfCFTA (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 28; Zamfir, 2017). But it raises the cost of ambitious deals with large partners such as China, India or Brazil: a country may hesitate to offer a strategic partner special terms if it may have to extend them to the EU.

Earlier arrangements (Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou) also shaped African policy choices. The EPAs went further by locking liberalisation in through binding, reciprocal obligations of indefinite duration. African governments are thereby prevented from fully using some of the very instruments that today's industrialised economies used during their own development. A partnership regime worthy of the name would give African governments the freedom to choose policies suited to their circumstances.

## 2.5. Practical trade problems and disruption of local markets

**Infrastructure.** The formal terms of an agreement are only part of the story. African exporters face long border delays, poor roads, inadequate ports, unreliable electricity and incompatible customs systems. These raise costs before goods ever reach Europe, and they obstruct trade within Africa too (UNCTAD, 2025a). Tariff concessions cannot substitute for investment in these systems.

**Import competition at home.** Liberalisation also exposes African producers to European competition in their own markets. Cheap European dairy powders, poultry cuts and processed tomato products have entered African markets at prices local producers could not match (Chibanda et al., 2022; Corniaux et al., 2020; GRET, 2007). Where European exports benefit from scale, public support, historical infrastructure or surplus production, African farmers and processors are pushed out. This does not mean every European import is harmful or that African markets should close. It

means that liberalisation must take account of vast differences in productive capacity. Opening an infant industry to powerful foreign suppliers before it has had time to grow can destroy it rather than make it efficient.

**Trade remedies.** Trade remedies are the legal tools meant to protect producers from unfair or damaging imports:

- anti-dumping duties, where imports are sold below their normal value; • countervailing duties, where imports are subsidised;
- safeguards, where a sudden import surge causes serious injury.

Each requires a formal investigation, evidence of injury, and proof that the imports caused it (World Trade Organization [WTO], n.d.). In Africa, these tools exist mainly on paper. As recently as 2019, only six African countries (South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius and Madagascar) had trade-remedy laws and investigating authorities, while Kenya and Ghana were still establishing theirs (Afronomicslaw, 2019). Most African countries therefore had no institution able to bring a case, however obvious the injury to their farmers.

Even capable authorities find the tools hard to use. When the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) imposed a safeguard on frozen chicken cuts from the EU in 2018, the European Commission challenged it under the SADC EPA. The arbitration panel ruled in the EU's favour in August 2022, citing problems including proportionality and delay, although the measure had already expired in March 2022 (European Commission, 2022b). The lesson is not that safeguards are impossible. It is that they are legally complex and costly to defend, and countries with limited legal capacity are placed at a structural disadvantage. A safeguard that exists on paper but cannot be used gives vulnerable industries little protection.

## 2.6. Fragmentation weakens Africa's negotiating power

The EPAs do not treat Africa as one bloc. They divide it into separate regional and bilateral arrangements:

- Cameroon alone implements the Central African EPA.
- The SADC EPA covers six of the sixteen SADC members.
- In West Africa, the regional EPA has not been implemented, and Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire operate separate arrangements.
- Kenya implements its EPA bilaterally (European Commission, n.d.-c, n.d.-f).

This patchwork creates different obligations for neighbours in the same regional community or customs union, complicating common external tariffs and coordinated trade policy. The dairy case shows the effect: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has adopted a regional strategy to promote local milk, but two of its members are bound by EPA commitments on milk powder that the rest of the region is not (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). Fragmentation also weakens bargaining power. The EU negotiates with small groups or single countries rather than with a continent acting together. Instead of reinforcing continental integration, the current arrangement preserves overlapping and sometimes conflicting commitments that AfCFTA must then untangle.

**What Section 2 shows.** African countries may have formal access to the European market, but formal access is not effective access:

- tariff structures have historically discouraged processing, and still do where preferences do not reach;
- product classification leaves important administrative power inside the EU's legal system;

- health, environmental and traceability requirements impose costs many African producers cannot meet;
- EPA restrictions limit the tools available for industrialisation;
- cheap European imports damage fragile domestic industries that lack usable trade remedies;
- fragmentation weakens Africa's collective bargaining position.

The result is a system that looks generous in tariff statistics while remaining damaging in its economic structure.

# 3. The Value-Chain Evidence: Why This Matters in Practice

The structural problems described above are not abstract. They are visible in real sectors. Cocoa shows how Africa can enjoy duty-free access yet capture little value. Dairy, poultry and tomato paste show the other side: how European exports into African markets have undermined African farmers and processors, and how hard it is for African governments to respond.

## 3.1. Cocoa: access without control of the final market

Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana export cocoa beans and processed cocoa ingredients to the EU. European and other international firms dominate trading, grinding, chocolate manufacture, branding and retail. The World Bank finds that Côte d'Ivoire supplies 40% of the world's cocoa but receives only between 5% and 7% of the profit generated by the sector globally (World Bank, 2019). Farmers' share of the retail price of chocolate is low, and attempts by companies to avoid the two governments' Living Income Differential, a premium meant to raise farm incomes, show how buyer power is used against producers (Odijie, 2021).

As shown in Section 2.1, qualifying processed cocoa from both countries already enters the EU duty-free, yet processed products still made up less than half of their cocoa exports to the EU in 2025 (European Commission, 2026d). This is the clearest proof of the paper's central argument. Removing a tariff does not redistribute ownership, create African brands, guarantee living incomes, or finance access to European retail shelves. Processing, branding and retail remain concentrated in Europe and North America, where finance, technology and marketing power are strongest. The EUDR now adds a new traceability burden at the farm end of the chain. Unless it is funded, it risks excluding exactly the smallholders who already receive the least.

This is not a story of African underperformance. It is a story of a value chain structured over decades to keep the lowest-value stage, primary production, in Africa, while the highest value stages remain elsewhere.

## 3.2. Dairy and fat-filled milk powder: the clearest case of a double standard

**What the product is.** Fat-filled milk powder (FFMP) is made by drying skimmed milk, which is left over when cream is removed to make butter, and adding vegetable fat, usually palm oil. It costs about 30% less than whole milk powder (Corniaux et al., 2020). According to French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD), palm oil is about thirteen times cheaper than butter oil (CIRAD, 2020). We will now consider the sale of FFMP from Europe to Africa and vice versa.

**Direction A: European FFMP into West Africa.** EU exports of these blends to West Africa grew from an annual average of 81,000 tonnes in 2000–2009 to 173,000 tonnes in 2010–2015 and

324,000 tonnes in 2019 (Corniaux et al., 2020). The Netherlands accounted for 12% of the European export volumes examined in 2019 (Corniaux et al., 2020). Over the same period, these blends came to dominate the region's market. By 2019, fat-filled powders made up more than two-thirds of West Africa's milk imports and more than a quarter of the dairy products consumed in the region, rising above 70% in most West African capitals (CIRAD, 2020). The trend is continental. Across Africa, imports of these blends rose from €1.5 billion in 2000 to €6.1 billion in 2020, and they now make up 40% of the value of Africa's dairy imports, mainly from the EU (Corniaux et al., 2023). Individual EU countries have built major export businesses on this trade. Ireland, the EU's largest FFMP exporter, sold more than 415,000 tonnes of it to West Africa between 2020 and 2024 (DeSmog, 2025). Irish FFMP exports to the region were worth €293.5 million in 2023, of which €88.4 million went to Nigeria alone (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024).

**Why it is so cheap.** Corniaux and colleagues link the boom to cheap vegetable fat, changes in the milk market, the end of EU milk quotas in 2015, corporate strategies, and growing demand (Corniaux et al., 2020). European dairy farmers also receive income support under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The European Commission maintains that today's CAP support is not trade-distorting (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024). Researchers from GRET and CIRAD disagree. They conclude that European policies encourage dumping on West African markets through CAP subsidies and the absence of market regulation, although European authorities do not recognise it as dumping (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). Whatever the legal label, West African farmers compete against a supply chain that has public support behind it, while they receive very little.

**The double standard.** FFMP cannot be sold as "milk" inside the EU, because EU law reserves that name for products made exclusively from milk. In Ireland, it is not sold to consumers at all: it goes business-to-business as an ingredient for other foods (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024). In West Africa, the same product is marketed to households as milk. Irish trade-agency market research found that Nigerian consumers do not necessarily understand the difference between FFMP and full-cream milk powder (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024). CIRAD found that around 30% of products made from fat-filled powders in West Africa do not meet international (Codex) labelling standards, and that palm-oil content is often not indicated (CIRAD, 2020). One FFMP brand sold in Nigeria was found to contain 10% protein and 35% fat, against the EU specification of at least 23% protein and no more than 30% fat (DeSmog, 2025). A product the EU will not call milk at home is sold as milk to some of the poorest consumers in the world.

**The impact on African dairy development.** A processor that can buy a cheap, storable, standardised imported powder has little reason to organise costly collection of fresh milk from dispersed herds. The data show the result. Depending on the country, only 1% to 7% of locally produced milk in West Africa is collected by dairy industries, and only 20% of the region's dairy companies collect local milk at all (CIRAD, 2020). Over the same period, West Africa's milk self-sufficiency fell from 60% at the turn of the century to 41% today (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). Nigeria shows the scale of the loss. Its herds produce about 600,000 tonnes of milk a year, meeting roughly 35% of national demand (DeSmog, 2025), and the country spends about US$1.3 billion a year on dairy imports (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024). Even the market leader has done little to break this import dependence. FrieslandCampina WAMCO (FCW), the Nigerian subsidiary of the Dutch dairy cooperative Royal FrieslandCampina, controls about 75% of Nigeria's dairy market (Ekumankama et al., 2020). It launched a Dairy Development Programme in 2010 to source raw milk locally, yet by 2016 local milk supplied only 3% of its needs, against a target of 10% (Okereocha, 2016; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017). Nigerian commercial farmers report that dairy farms close within five years of opening because they cannot compete with imported powder (Noteworthy/The Journal, 2024). The cost is not only today's lost sales. It is collection networks,

skills, and processing capacity that never develop, and millions of pastoral families are shut out of the market. Ekumankama et al. find the problem "multifaceted": they blame Nigeria's institutional and infrastructure defects as well as the "faulty integration designs adopted by FCW" (Ekumankama et al., 2020).

**Lost policy space.** West Africa's common external tariff on bulk milk powders is just 5% (CIRAD, 2020). ECOWAS has adopted a regional strategy that explicitly calls for raising it, and a study for Oxfam modelled a rise to 35% on FFMP. That rise would increase farmers' incomes and the region's self-sufficiency, with modest effects on average consumer costs (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). Yet the EPAs provide for complete liberalisation of imported powders for processing or repackaging in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, so raising the tariff would require renegotiating their EPAs. Some countries would also exceed their WTO commitments (Levard & Corniaux, 2024). This is EPA policy restriction in practice: the regional tool most likely to revive local dairy is legally locked.

**Direction B: African FFMP into the EU.** The reverse route is far harder. Take a Nigerian firm wanting to export a dairy blend to Europe:

- Nigeria has no EPA and trades under standard GSP. For fat-filled milk powder, the EU's standard duty is 7.6% plus an agricultural component. Under GSP, a Nigerian exporter that meets the rules of origin pays 4.1% plus the agricultural component (European Commission, n.d.-h; rates as of October 2026). The agricultural component is an extra duty the EU charges on processed foods according to their milk fat, milk protein, starch, and sugar content. It is designed to protect European dairy and sugar producers, and its exact amount depends on the product's recipe.
- Dairy and composite products of animal origin can only come from approved countries and listed establishments, with official certification and residue monitoring (Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, n.d.; European Commission, n.d.- e).
- Nor could the product be labelled "milk" in the EU, because it is not made exclusively from milk.

European firms can draw on mature production and regulatory systems built with public support. African firms must finance both their own compliance and the public veterinary and laboratory systems needed to certify it. This is the asymmetry. European FFMP enters West Africa at a flat 5% tariff. Nigerian FFMP entering Europe pays 4.1% plus a milk-linked agricultural duty, and must also clear establishment listing and costly certification. The protection Europe keeps for its own dairy sector is the protection West Africa cannot raise for its own.

**What should change.** Support the ECOWAS Regional Offensive for local milk, including the right to raise the external tariff without EPA penalty; enforce honest labelling, so that products made from fat-filled powder are not sold as milk; require European exporters receiving public trade promotion to report on their local sourcing and labelling practices; and encourage European dairy cooperatives operating in African markets to open their membership to African dairy farmers.

### 3.3. Poultry: documented dumping, a neutralised safeguard and uneven capacity

Frozen poultry parts move from Europe and other exporters into African markets, where they compete with locally raised birds. Ghana shows the result. The U.S. Department of Agriculture forecast Ghana's chicken meat imports at 270,000 tonnes in 2024 and reported that domestic broiler production still accounts for less than five percent of total chicken meat production, despite years of government support (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2024). Farm-level research explains why: cheap frozen imports make year-round marketing difficult, push producers into seasonal production, and hit small producers hardest (Chibanda et al., 2022). The pattern has persisted. A

study of Ghanaian poultry policy from 1999 to 2019 finds that domestic production growth remained "notably lower than the escalating imports of frozen poultry meat" (Zamani et al., 2025).

There is also direct official evidence against European exporters. South Africa's International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) found dumping, and material injury or threat of injury, involving frozen bone-in chicken from Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Spain, alongside Brazil. The duties approved in 2022 were suspended for twelve months to protect food affordability and took effect in August 2023 (ITAC, 2023). This is a formal legal finding that specific European sources dumped poultry into an African market.

The SACU safeguard case shows the other side. When the region tried to protect its producers from a surge of EU chicken, the EU took it to arbitration and won (European Commission, 2022b). South Africa is one of the very few African countries with an established investigating authority. Most African countries had no trade-remedy institution at all (Afronomicslaw, 2019). Facing similar pressures, Cameroon imposed a strict import quota in 2005, and Nigeria earlier imposed a ban (Chibanda et al., 2022). Those blunt administrative measures were used precisely because the formal investigative route was not available to them.

### 3.4. Tomatoes: European tomato paste and the decline of local processing in Ghana

Until the early 1980s, Ghana had dynamic tomato production and processing. A GRET agricultural trade handbook describes how competition from inexpensive Italian tomato paste contributed to the closure of Ghanaian processing plants and the loss of hundreds of jobs. It attributes the competitiveness of those imports partly to EU support at the time: production aid to tomato producers' organisations and export subsidies. Ghana, importing more than 10,000 tonnes of processed tomatoes a year, became the principal African importer of processed tomatoes (GRET, 2007). International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) researchers similarly report that competition from foreign tomato paste has been blamed in part for the closure of two of Ghana's three large tomato processing plants (Robinson & Kolavalli, 2010).

The handbook also shows that domestic policy constraints mattered. Processing plants were privatised under structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s, customs duties were lowered, and WTO accession commitments limited Ghana's ability to raise tariffs again (GRET, 2007). Ghana was thus doubly exposed: subsidised imports arrived just as the policy tools to respond were being taken away. The handbook documents harm to domestic production, not a formal WTO dumping determination. No such determination exists because Ghana had no functioning investigating authority to bring one.

The damage has lasted. According to researchers at Ghana's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Ghana's demand for fresh and processed tomatoes exceeds 1.4 million tonnes a year, but domestic production meets only 15% to 18% of it. Ghana now spends at least US$168 million a year on tomato imports, including about US$150 million on processed tomato products, largely from China and Europe (Ghana News Agency, 2026). Earlier figures show tomato paste and concentrate imports worth US$112.8 million in 2015 alone (Ghana Export-Import Bank, 2022). Average yields remain at 7 to 10 tonnes per hectare against a potential of 20 to 80 (Ghana News Agency, 2026). Once a processing industry has been dismantled, the foreign-exchange bill continues year after year. Rebuilding requires investment in seed, irrigation and processors, and contracts between processors and growers.

### 3.5. What these cases establish

The four cases show different mechanisms at work within one structure. In cocoa, buyer power keeps value in Europe even though duty-free access has been granted. In dairy, a European product that cannot be sold as milk at home undermines African milk collection, while the corrective tariff is locked by EPA commitments and Europe keeps its own dairy duties. In poultry, formal dumping findings against EU exporters sit alongside a regional safeguard defeated in arbitration. In tomato paste, a processing industry was lost to subsidised imports just as the policy tools to resist were being removed. Together, these cases confirm the paper's core position: There should be no double standards in EU-Africa trade rules. EU policies that undermine value addition in Africa should be discouraged. They also show that most African countries lack the institutional capacity to use the trade remedies that WTO rules formally allow.

## 4. The Governance Architecture: Why Development Commitments Do Not Bind

To understand why this structure persists, it helps to see that EU–Africa trade is governed by layers of instruments, not just the treaty texts.

At the top sit the EU Treaties. Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) makes reducing and ultimately eradicating poverty the primary objective of EU development cooperation. It also requires the EU to take development objectives into account in all policies likely to affect developing countries (European Union, 2016). On paper, therefore, EU trade policy towards Africa cannot be reduced to tariff liberalisation.

The EPAs themselves contain development-cooperation and monitoring provisions alongside their tariff schedules. But look at how they are written. A tariff schedule states exactly which rate applies, to which product, from which date. A promise to cooperate on productive capacity usually leaves the budget, timetable and result undefined. The SADC EPA links EU financing to the rules and procedures of the EU's own funding instruments (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 12). It also excludes most of its sustainable-development chapter from ordinary dispute settlement (Economic Partnership Agreement, 2016, art. 6(3)).

The result is one-sided enforceability. If an African country raises a tariff, imposes a safeguard or taxes an export in breach of its EPA, the EU can take it to arbitration, as SACU discovered over chicken. If the EU or its member states fail to deliver promised support for productive capacity, African countries have no equivalent legal route to force delivery. Development cooperation depends on political will, programming cycles and available budgets. The CBAM shows the pattern again: the import obligations are binding law, while the promised support for the least developed countries was dropped and the revenues directed to the EU's own Innovation Fund (African Climate Foundation & LSE, 2023). Newer agreements such as ESA4 contain stronger sustainability commitments (European Commission, 2026c), but development finance still does not become an enforceable obligation.

The system therefore ensures that market-opening commitments are kept, but leaves development promises flexible and discretionary. That is a central reason why decades of generous-sounding market access have not produced structural transformation in Africa. Reform should specify which party delivers which support, by when, with what funding, and what happens if it does not.

**What Section 4 shows.** The EU's own Treaty requires it to take development objectives into account in all policies affecting developing countries. Yet the agreements are built so that only one kind of commitment can be enforced. African obligations on tariffs, safeguards and export taxes can be taken to arbitration; European promises of support for productive capacity cannot. Until development commitments carry budgets, timetables and consequences, they will keep losing out to market-opening obligations.

# 5. Recommendations.

The recommendations in this section will apply to both the Netherlands and the EU. By far the most important action that the EU can take to promote sustainable and mutually beneficial trade relations with Africa is to abolish its policies that encourage double standards. The EU must stop the practice of promoting agricultural subsidies at home while at the same time advocating free markets in Africa. As has been demonstrated in the cases of chicken, tomato paste, and dairy, EU agricultural subsidies have imperilled agricultural production in Africa. For this to work, the process of the abolition of such double standards cannot be a unilateral act of the EU. This means that when designing the rules of engagement for EU-Africa relations, the EU should involve African governments and producers from the start, not consult them after decisions are made.

In addition to the above, EU double standards with respect to its food policies must also be discontinued. If, for example, FFMP is not considered as milk in Europe, the EU should never allow its companies to sell it as milk in Africa. The eradication of double standards will not only restore trust in EU-Africa relations, but it will also ensure a win-win symbiotic trade relationship between the EU and Africa in an increasingly multipolar world. Once meaningful progress is made in this direction, market forces will ensure that EU-Africa trade and trust will become more equitable and sustainable. Under such circumstances, the various complaints and problems documented in this fact sheet that are currently associated with EU-Africa trade will easily be resolved. This will be done without the liability of the now worn and ridiculed facade that Europe is here to help Africa develop with development aid.

It is in the economic interest of Europe that Africa is given space to develop. It is also in the political interest of Europe that its rising trust deficit in its relationship with Africa is contained and reversed. In the Netherlands, for instance, the Dutch Africa Strategy 2023–2032 promised that going forward Dutch-Africa relations would be founded more on equality than they were in the past. This has laid a solid foundation for a change of direction in Dutch-Africa relations.

# References

African Climate Foundation & London School of Economics and Political Science. (2023). Implications for African countries of a carbon border adjustment mechanism in the EU. https://www.lse.ac.uk/africa/assets/Documents/AFC-and-LSE-Report-Implications-for Africa-of-a-CBAM-in-the-EU.pdf

Afronomicslaw. (2019, February 25). Trade remedies in Africa: Taking stock and considerations for newbies in the game. https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/02/25/trade remedies-in-africa-taking-stock-and-considerations-for-newbies-in-the-game

Chibanda, C., Almadani, M. I., Thobe, P., & Wieck, C. (2022). Broiler production systems in Ghana: Economics and the impact of frozen chicken imports. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 25(4), 619–634. https://doi.org/10.22434/IFAMR2021.0142

CIRAD. (2020, December 8). Imports of milk powders into West Africa [Press release on Duteurtre, Corniaux & De Palmas, Lait, commerce et développement au Sahel]. https://www.cirad.fr/en/press-area/press-releases/2020/imports-milk-powders-west-africa

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1776 of 9 October 2019 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (2019). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2019:280:FULL

Corniaux, C., Chatellier, V., Dia, D., & Duteurtre, G. (2020). De l'huile de palme dans le lait : comment l'Union européenne renforce sa présence sur le marché laitier Ouest africain en vendant un succédané de poudre de lait. Rencontres Recherches Ruminants, 25, 289–293. https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-03208468/document

Corniaux, C., Duteurtre, G., Dia, D., & Chatellier, V. (2023). The rise of fat-filled dairy blends in European dairy exports to West Africa. Économie rurale Agricultures, alimentations, territoire, Vol. 386, pp.111-124. https://doi.org/10.4000/economierurale.12176

Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine. (n.d.). Products of animal origin for human consumption: Milk and milk products. Government of Ireland. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-agriculture-food-and-the marine/services/products-of-animal-origin-for-human-consumption-milk-and-milk-products/

DeSmog. (2025, July 14). How Ireland's "mediocre" milk powder made it big in West Africa [Joint investigation with Premium Times]. https://www.desmog.com/2025/07/14/ireland-mediocre-milk-powder-west-africa/

Economic partnership agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part (2016). https://www.sacu.int/uploads/documents/159d729b0875a67e2331a54b2123561352fae7dc.pdf

Ekumankama, O., A. Ezeoha, and C. Uche. 2020. The role of multinational corporations in local dairy value chain development: Case of Friesland Campina WAMCO (FCW) in Nigeria. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 23(1), 55–70. https://doi.org/10.22434/IFAMR2018.0108

European Commission. (n.d.-a). CBAM definitive regime. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism/cbam definitive-regime_en

European Commission. (n.d.-b). Corporate sustainability due diligence. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/business-and-industry/company-law-and corporate-governance/corporate-sustainability-due-diligence_en

European Commission. (n.d.-c). Economic partnership agreements (EPAs). Access2Markets. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to markets/en/content/economic-partnership-agreements-epas

European Commission. (n.d.-d). EU–Africa: Global Gateway investment package. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global gateway/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package_en

European Commission. (n.d.-e). EU entry conditions for composite products. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://food.ec.europa.eu/horizontal-topics/international-affairs/eu entry-conditions/composite-products_en

European Commission. (n.d.-f). EU–Kenya agreement. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries and-regions/east-african-community-eac/eu-kenya-agreement_en

European Commission. (n.d.-g). Generalised Scheme of Preferences. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/generalised scheme-preferences_en

European Commission. (n.d.-h). My Trade Assistant: Product code 1901 90 95 from Nigeria to the Netherlands. Access2Markets. Retrieved October 27, 2026, from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/home

European Commission. (n.d.-i). Regulation on deforestation-free products. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/forests/deforestation/regulation deforestation-free-products_en

European Commission. (2022a, October 11). Individual information sheets on implementation of EU trade agreements (SWD (2022) 730 final). https://eur lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022SC0730

European Commission. (2022b, August 3). Panel rules in favour of EU on Southern African Customs Union's safeguard on EU poultry cuts. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/panel rules-favour-eu-southern-african-customs-unions-safeguard-eu-poultry-cuts-2022-08-03_en

European Commission. (2026a). CBAM questions and answers. https://taxation customs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/013fa763-5dce-4726-a204-69fec04d5ce2_en

European Commission. (2026b, May 20). European Union, trade in goods with Africa (all countries). https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/region/details_africa-all countries_en.pdf

European Commission. (2026c). Factsheet: The EU–ESA4 enhanced economic partnership agreement (EPA). https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and region/countries-and-regions/eastern-and-southern-africa-esa/factsheet-eu-esa4-enhanced economic-partnership-agreement-epa_en

European Commission. (2026d) EU Trade Relations with West Africa. Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission

European External Action Service. (2026, April 21). European Union and AfCFTA Secretariat strengthen their partnership to promote intra-African trade and investment. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african-union-au/european-union-and afcfta-secretariat-strengthen-their-partnership-promote-intra-african-trade-and_en

European Union. (2016). Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C202, Vol. 59. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL

Ghana Export-Import Bank. (2022). Agri-commodity digest newsletter (Vol.1). https://eximbankghana.com/wp content/uploads/2024/05/9dd0bc8a7de14624b4a53e15c65243b7-compressed eb71480c2580756980bb6ab39ce3a269.pdf

Ghana News Agency. (2026). Ghana spends $168m on tomato imports; ginger dependence exceeds 99% [Reporting CSIR research]. Modern Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/1518434/ghana-spends-168m-on-tomato imports-ginger-depen.html

GRET. (2007). Agriculture and the WTO in Africa: Understand to act (M.-C. Lebret & A. Alpha, Eds.). CTA/Éditions du GRET. https://gret.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GP 22_Agriculture-and-the-WTO-in-Africa-1.pdf

GSP Hub. (n.d.). The GSP and Africa. http://gsphub.eu/about-gsp/gsp-and-africa

International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa. (2023, August 3). Anti dumping duties on frozen bone-in portions of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus originating in or imported from Brazil, Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Spain: Final determination. https://itac.org.za/anti-dumping-duties-on-frozen-bone-in-portions-of-fowls of-the-species-gallus-domesticus-originating-in-or-imported-from-brazil-denmark-ireland poland-and-spain-final-determination/

Levard, L., & Corniaux, C. (2024). What trade and tax policies are needed for the sustainable development of local milk value chains in West Africa? Proposals to the West African and European actors. GRET/CIRAD for Oxfam, Humundi and CFSI . https://oxfambelgie.be/sites/default/files/2024-01/Trade and Tax policies for Local dairy value chain West Africa ENGLISH.pdf

Noteworthy/The Journal. (2024, August). Creamed off: Irish products among cheap EU dairy forcing some West African farmers out of business [Joint investigation with Premium Times]. https://www.thejournal.ie/creamed-off-dairy-exports-6461193-Aug2024/

Odijie, M. (2021, June 30). Opinion: Why efforts by Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to help cocoa farmers haven't worked. UCL. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2021/jun/opinion-why-efforts cote-divoire-and-ghana-help-cocoa-farmers-havent-worked

Okereocha, C. (2016, November 7). Dairy industry: Local raw milk to the rescue. The Nation. https://thenationonlineng.net/dairy-industry-local-raw-milk-rescue/

PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2017). Transforming Nigeria's agricultural value chain: A case study of the cocoa and dairy industries. https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/assets/pdf/transforming nigeria-s-agric-value-chain.pdf.

Regulation (EU) 2026/1395 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2026 on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 (2026). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1395/oj/eng

Robinson, E. J. Z., & Kolavalli, S. (2010). The case of tomato in Ghana: Processing (GSSP Working Paper No. 21). International Food Policy Research Institute. https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/gsspwp/21.html

United Nations. (1957). Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (with Annexes and Protocols), Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and EURATOM, Treaty Series, Vol 298. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20298/v298.pdf

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2016). Trade and development report 2016: Structural transformation for inclusive and sustained growth. United Nations. https://unctad.org/publication/trade-and-development-report-2016

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2025a). Economic development in Africa report 2024: Unlocking Africa's trade potential—Boosting regional markets and reducing risks (UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2024). United Nations. https://unctad.org/publication/economic-development-africa-report-2024

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2025b). The state of commodity dependence 2025 (UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2025/3). United Nations. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccom2025d3_intro_en.pdf

United Nations Industrial Development Organization. (2024). International yearbook of industrial statistics 2024: Factsheet Africa. https://stat.unido.org/portal/storage/file/publications/yb/2024/YB-core-2024-regfacts afr-pdf.pdf

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. (2024). Ghana poultry voluntary update 2024 (GH2024-0002). https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Ghana+Poultry+Voluntary+Update+2024_Accra_Ghana_GH2024-0002

World Bank. (2019, July 11). Côte d'Ivoire economic outlook: Why the time has come to produce cocoa in a responsible manner. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/publication/cote-divoire economic-outlook-why-the-time-has-come-to-produce-cocoa-in-a-responsible-manner

World Trade Organization. (n.d.). Anti-dumping: Technical information. Retrieved October 26, 2026, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm

Zamani, O., Chibanda, C., Boimah, M., & Asante-Addo, C. (2025). Aligning policy for success in developing countries: Evidence from the poultry sector of Ghana. Agricultural and Food Economics. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-025-00348-8

Zamfir, I. (2017, September). Economic partnership agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (PE 608.686). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608686/EPRS_BRI(201 7)608686_EN.pdf

Deze factsheet is tot stand gekomen in het kader van de samenwerking van de Tweede Kamer met De Jonge Akademie, de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen (KNAW), de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), TNO, UMCNL (universitair medische centra), de Vereniging Hogescholen en de Vereniging Universiteiten van Nederland (UNL).

**Disclaimer**
De Jonge Akademie, KNAW, NWO, TNO, UMCNL, UNL en VH bemiddelen tussen parlementaire kennisvraag en wetenschappelijk kennisaanbod. De informatie in het kader van Parlement en Wetenschap is afkomstig van vooraanstaande (wetenschappelijk) onderzoekers, maar niet onderworpen aan peer review en niet door de onderzoeks- en wetenschapsorganisaties geverifieerd.