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**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL**

**The European Annual Asylum and Migration Report
(2025)**

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I. Introduction

The European Annual Asylum and Migration Report (the Report) is a key deliverable of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (the Pact) that provides a strategic situational picture in this area. It analyses the asylum, migration and reception situation in the Union and in the Member States over the previous 12-month period and establishes a projection of the migratory trends for the coming year¹.

The Pact marked a major milestone in the development of a comprehensive approach to migration, asylum, border management and integration. It is designed to manage migration in the long term, providing Member States with the flexibility to address effectively and fairly the specific challenges they face. The strength of the Pact lies in the **balance between the principles of solidarity and a fair sharing of responsibility** among Member States. To this end, Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management², one of the legislative acts composing the Pact, introduces a mandatory, flexible and needs-based solidarity mechanism. The functioning of this mechanism is informed by the assessment of the asylum and migration situation in the Union presented in the Report, which forms part of the **annual migration management cycle** (the Cycle).

The Commission launched the first Cycle with the adoption of this Report, which also includes an update of progress made and challenges in the implementation of the Pact³. The situational picture provided for by this Report is also to be used by the Commission for the purposes of adopting the **Commission implementing Decision**⁴ (the Decision) determining which Member States are under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1351.

The Report and the Decision are accompanied by a **Commission proposal for a Council implementing Decision establishing the Annual Solidarity Pool**⁵ to address the solidarity needs of Member States under pressure in the upcoming year. In parallel, the work continues

¹ Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj>).

² Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management.

³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions State of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM/2025/319 final ([EUR-Lex - 52025DC0319 - EN - EUR-Lex](#)).

⁴ Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management.

⁵ Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management.

on the implementation of all the components of the Pact, to provide an effective European system of solidarity and responsibility to manage asylum and migration in a fair, firm and effective way.

II. Delivering on the Pact: responsibility and solidarity in balance

Member States are advancing in the preparations to implement the reforms of the Pact and to fulfil the new obligations on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.

In the area of **responsibility**, the main novelties of the Pact are centred on creating more efficient, firm and fair procedures that will lead to more streamlined and effective asylum and migration systems, with lower administrative burdens on Member States, faster processing, adequate support provided to migrants and high-quality decisions on their cases. Notably, the new screening⁶ at the Union's external borders will allow to swiftly identify and assess all third-country nationals illegally entering the Union. As part of the mandatory asylum and return border procedures⁷, applications from nationals of countries with a low likelihood of receiving international protection will be dealt with in an accelerated manner, directly at the Union's external borders. The new responsibility rules⁸ will enable a quicker and more efficient procedure to establish the Member States responsible for processing applications for international protection. The renewed Eurodac database⁹ and the new rules on reception¹⁰ will have a positive impact on managing and limiting unauthorised movements.

In that respect, the Member States of first entry of irregular migrants into the Union will have to shoulder several new tasks, notably in view of the nature of migratory flows arriving at the Union's external borders. In particular, they will need to invest significant efforts to fulfil their obligations in screening and registering all irregular arrivals, setting up the 'adequate capacity' for the mandatory border procedure, as well as assessing applications for international protection.

To support notably these Member States, a permanent **solidarity** mechanism has been established by Regulation (EU) 2024/1351. It balances the challenges and the responsibilities

⁶ Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 introducing the screening of third-country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1356/oj>.

⁷ Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1348/oj> and Regulation (EU) 2024/1349 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a return border procedure, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1148; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1349/oj>.

⁸ Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj>.

⁹ Regulation (EU) 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of biometric data in order to effectively apply Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 2001/55/EC and to identify illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1358/oj>.

¹⁰ Directive (EU) 2024/1346 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1346/oj>.

placed on various Member States. To operationalise the mechanism, in line with the same Regulation, every year the Commission assesses the overall migratory situation in the Union to determine whether there are Member States under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure, or facing a significant migratory situation. To do so, the Commission developed a **methodology**, in consultation with Member States, to assess whether there are Member States facing disproportionate obligations, taking into account the overall situation in the Union. It relies on available high-quality data and information, ensuring that the results are fair, objective and consistent with the legal requirements. The methodology is described in detail in a dedicated Commission Staff Working Document¹¹.

Having identified the Member States under migratory pressure, and taking into account the findings of the Report, including its projection for the coming year, the Commission also proposes the level of solidarity contributions that should be provided to Member States under migratory pressure. Member States can provide solidarity contributions in various forms:

- **Relocation**, which consists of transferring applicants from Member States under migratory pressure to other, contributing Member States. Member States could also use responsibility offsets, a form of solidarity where Member States that are affected by unauthorised movements can offer, if certain conditions are met, to take over responsibility for applicants already present on their territory from Member States under migratory pressure.
- **Financial contributions** consisting in transfers of amounts from the contributing Member States to the Union budget, aimed at actions to support the benefitting Member States, for instance, in the management of their migration, asylum and reception systems, border management, or to fund, as regards Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and under certain conditions, projects and actions in the external dimension of migration, including to reduce irregular arrivals and increase returns.
- **Alternative solidarity measures**, which can include, for example, material or technical in-kind assistance, including for border management.

The solidarity measures will be identified in the Council Implementing Decision to be adopted pursuant to Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 establishing the **Annual Solidarity Pool** (the Solidarity Pool), based on a Commission proposal pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351. Pursuant to Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, Member States must agree on the size of the Solidarity Pool for the following year and on how each Member State will contribute, according to its fair share, and in accordance with the pledging exercise carried out in the High-Level EU Solidarity Forum. In its Decision, the Council should capture the result of the pledging exercise in relation to the needs identified by Member States under pressure, including as regards the use of responsibility offsets.

The Member States considered by the Commission as being under migratory pressure will then have access to the Solidarity Pool and will not be obliged to implement their pledged solidarity contributions, while Member States facing a significant migratory situation will be able to receive, upon their request, full or partial deduction of their solidarity contributions by the Council. At the same time, contributing Member States are not required to implement their pledges towards a benefitting Member State, where the Commission has identified systemic

¹¹ SWD(2025) 792, Methodology for the purposes of Commission implementing decision pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

shortcomings in that Member State with regard to the rules on responsibility under Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 that could result in serious negative consequences for the functioning of the system.

In addition to the Solidarity Pool, the Pact establishes a **Permanent EU Migration Support Toolbox** consisting of the provision of operational and technical assistance by the relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies; support provided by the Union funds and through other funding sources; derogations in the Union acquis to react to specific migratory challenges; activation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism; measures to facilitate return and reintegration activities; strengthened actions and cross-sectoral activities in the external dimension of migration; enhanced diplomatic and political outreach; coordinated communication strategies; supporting effective and human rights-based migration policies in third countries or promoting legal migration and well-managed mobility. The EU Migration Support Toolbox is available to Member States and can be tailored to their specific needs.

This is particularly important for Member States at risk of migratory pressure, which will be able to benefit from priority access to this Support Toolbox. The Commission will provide funding support and also coordinate with the Agencies possible prioritisation of the provision of operational support.

Implementation of the Pact – state of play

Since the Pact entered into force in June 2024, and following the adoption of the Common Implementation Plan, Member States, supported by the Commission and the relevant Union Agencies, have stepped up efforts to turn the legislative agreement into practical reality and ensure their national asylum, reception and migration systems will be ready for the full application of the Pact by June 2026. At the same time, there is a general need to speed up the pace of these reforms.

Across the Union, as well as at national level, after the initial phase that led to the development of National Implementation Plans and the relevant governance arrangements, the focus has shifted. Now it is on **legislative adaptation, practical operationalisation, and resourcing of reforms**.

Since the last report, **important milestones** have been met at all levels. These include the development of national strategies and contingency plans, adaptations of national legal frameworks, and the adoption of the Commission Implementing Regulation laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351¹². The number of Member States set to meet their **adequate capacity** goals for the new border procedure has increased and testing of Eurodac has started.

At the same time, **remaining challenges are becoming clearer**. This is particularly the case regarding the implementation of Eurodac, the setting-up of the border procedure and the need to put in place necessary infrastructure, staffing needs and administrative arrangements in a timely manner. Across the Union, screening arrangements should soon be finalised and the reception capacity adapted to the new framework, ensuring sufficient capacity and adequate

¹² Commission Implementing Regulation laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards asylum and migration management and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003.

standards. While most Member States have done so, outstanding arrangements relating to the fundamental rights monitoring and legal counselling need to be concluded.

The Commission and all Member States must continue to work together to ensure that financial programming is aligned effectively behind the national plans and that the key elements of the new framework are sufficiently resourced, be it from Union or national funds.

A detailed state of play of the implementation of the Pact can be found in the Annex.

III. Strategic situational picture of the area of asylum, reception and migration

The evidence in this Report underpins the Commission's Decision identifying the migratory situation in the Member States and the Commission's proposal for a Council Implementing Decision establishing the Annual Solidarity Pool necessary to address the migratory situation. As such, the Report provides a comprehensive and strategic situational picture that serves also as an early warning and awareness tool for the Union in the area of migration and asylum.

The strategic situational picture consists of: a) an **analysis** of the main developments in the area of asylum, reception and migration in the Union and in all the Member States over the 12-month period between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025; and b) a **projection** for 2026 and information on the level of **preparedness** in the Union and the Member States to respond and adapt to the anticipated trends. The overview in this Report also includes findings from the monitoring undertaken by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), and the evaluation carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2022/922¹³.

It is based on quantitative and qualitative data and information provided by Member States, relevant Union Agencies¹⁴ and the European External Action Service. The analysis and the projection also build on the results of regular exchanges within the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint Network¹⁵.

The strategic situational picture is included in this Report, and it is complemented by a Commission Staff Working Document containing the statistical breakdown supporting the analysis in the Report, a Commission Staff Working Document providing detailed information

¹³ The result of the monitoring undertaken by the Asylum Agency as well as the monitoring carried out in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1356 referred in Article 9(e) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 are not available as these monitoring mechanisms are not yet operational.

¹⁴ The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

¹⁵ The Blueprint Network, an early deliverable of the Pact, is the operational framework bringing together relevant EU stakeholders to monitor and anticipate migration flows and situations. It was established by Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/1366 of 23 September 2020 on an EU mechanism for preparedness and management of crises related to migration, [EUR-Lex - 32020H1366 - EN - EUR-Lex](#).

supporting the analysis¹⁶ and the Commission Staff Working Document containing the details of the projection for 2026¹⁷.

a. Analysis of the asylum, reception and migration situation between July 2024 and June 2025

Overall, between July 2024 and June 2025, **the migratory situation in the Union continued to improve** compared to previous years. Irregular arrivals to the EU, applications for international protection and unauthorised movements decreased¹⁸, a stable trend already observed since 2024. This is also thanks to the joint efforts by the Commission and Member States in stepping up cooperation with countries of origin and transit and strengthening the Union's external borders.

Irregular migration at the Union's external borders¹⁹

Illegal border crossings (IBCs)²⁰ at the Union's external borders **decreased by 35% compared to July 2023-June 2024**. Decreasing trends were observed along most migratory routes, including along those accounting for most IBCs to the Union.

¹⁶ SWD(2025) 790 Supporting the analysis of the asylum, reception and migration situation in the Union and in the Member States and SWD (2025) 793 Statistical breakdown supporting the analysis of the asylum, reception and migration situation in the Union and in the Member States are marked as sensitive as they contain data which shall not be disclosed to the public given the granularity of the information therein and the risk of hampering Union Agencies and Commission operational activities.


¹⁷ SWD(2025) 791, Projection pursuant to Article 9(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the year 2026, classified as "RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED".

¹⁸ Since this Report covers the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, the year-to-year comparison ("previous reporting period") refers to the 12-month period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024.

¹⁹ The analysis in this section is based on Frontex data.

²⁰ The number of illegal border crossings (IBCs) refers to the number of third-country or EU/Schengen Associated Country nationals detected by Member State authorities when entering or when attempting to exit illegally the territory between border crossing points (BCPs) at external borders. However, it is possible that a third country national is detected more than once entering/exiting illegally the territory of a Member State.

Figure 1 – Illegal border crossings by migratory route²¹



Source: JRC elaboration on Frontex data

While the migratory situation in **Greece** remained overall stable, the country recorded the highest number of IBCs relative to its GDP and population²², as well as the majority of IBCs along the Eastern Mediterranean route (over 60 000 IBCs), mostly from Türkiye and Libya, with a marked increase in arrivals registered in Crete. In **Cyprus**, IBCs decreased significantly – mostly due to fewer departures from Syria and Lebanon – including because of the fall of the Assad regime and the increased engagement with Lebanese authorities. However, relative to its GDP and population, Cyprus still ranked third in the Union in terms of irregular arrivals – almost 3 000 IBCs. In **Bulgaria**, IBCs slightly decreased, with irregular arrivals coming from Türkiye.

In **Italy and Spain**, IBCs decreased compared to the period July 2023-June 2024, despite the numbers remaining high in absolute terms. Departures to Italy decreased, partly due to stronger cooperation with Tunisian authorities²³ and tighter border controls at the Turkish border. Departures from Libya remained high and further increased as smuggling networks exploited the growing instability in the region. IBCs to Spain decreased due to fewer arrivals along the

²¹ Routes with more than 500 IBCs are included in this map.

²² Calculated comparing the share of each Member State for this indicator with its share of GDP and population. The share of GDP and population for each Member States is calculated in accordance with the reference key set out in Article 66 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, using Eurostat data.

²³ Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic and global partnership between the European Union and Tunisia, signed in July 2023.

Atlantic route to the Canary Islands, following enhanced bilateral and Union cooperation with West African countries, notably with Mauritania²⁴ and Senegal. Enhanced border surveillance in Mauritania and in Senegal led smugglers to re-route departures via Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and The Gambia. On the Western Mediterranean route, Algeria was the main departure point – accounting for 79% of IBCs on the route – and registering increased IBCs towards the Balearic Islands. Departures from Morocco decreased significantly as a result of strengthened bilateral cooperation with Spain and enhanced border surveillance.

Along the **Channel**, departures from France to the United Kingdom (IBCs on exit) increased by 15% compared to July 2023-June 2024. While border management efforts in France prevented 40% of the over 72 000 recorded IBCs exiting from France to the United Kingdom, successful crossings (arrivals to the United Kingdom) still increased by about 35% compared to July 2023-June 2024.

In the **Western Balkans** region, irregular arrivals decreased significantly compared to July 2023-June 2024. The implementation of the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans²⁵ provided political, financial and operational support to migration management in the region²⁶. Enhanced police controls that disrupted migrant smuggling activities, as well as decreasing IBCs on the Eastern Mediterranean route, also contributed to lower the number of irregular arrivals. The corridor via Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia remained the most used one, even though with fewer IBCs than in July 2023-June 2024. Increased migratory activity along this corridor has been observed since late October 2023, after smugglers redirected their activities towards that border section to avoid increased police operations in Serbia. During the reporting period, **Croatia** registered 76% of the arrivals in the region – over 12 000 IBCs – and the second highest number of IBCs at Union level relative to GDP and population.

At the **Union's Eastern border**, the number of IBCs remained low and relatively stable. Most of those IBCs involved Ukrainian nationals irregularly crossing into Romania and requesting temporary protection. Actions by Russia and Belarus continue to influence migratory dynamics at the Eastern border, especially in **Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Estonia**. In response to continued state-sponsored attempts to weaponise migration, they strengthened border controls, reducing the number of IBCs from Belarus (1 421 IBCs, of which 82% to Poland). The risk of weaponisation of migration remains a serious migration and security challenge, adding to occasional violent incidents and attempts to cross the border. Poland established a buffer zone along its border and temporarily limits the right to apply for international protection at that border, except for vulnerable groups. Furthermore, Latvia and Lithuania enhanced surveillance measures at their border with Belarus. Estonia strengthened border management measures at the border with Russia, while Finland closed its crossing points with Russia as of November 2023 as a response to Russia's attempts to weaponise

²⁴ Joint Declaration establishing a migration partnership between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the European Union launched in March 2024.

²⁵ EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans of 5 December 2022 available at https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/eu-action-plan-western-balkans_en.

²⁶ A new generation Status Agreement was signed with Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2025, which enables Frontex SCOs to work alongside local Border Management authorities with executive powers - allowing the entire Western Balkan region (except Kosovo - designation without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence) to be covered with such Agreements and subsequent deployments.

migration. Since then, the migratory situation at the border with Russia, including with Estonia, has remained relatively calm.

Between July 2024 and June 2025, over 110 000 people were **refused entry** at the Union's external borders, mainly at land (55%) and air (41%) borders. Most refusals of entry were due to missing or invalid documentation²⁷. Poland, Croatia, France and Romania recorded the highest numbers in absolute terms, while Croatia, Latvia and Estonia issued most refusals relative to their GDP and population. Most refusals of entry involved Ukrainians²⁸, Albanians, Moldovans and Turks.

As highlighted in the 2025 State of Schengen report, sustained efforts are needed to strengthen the **quality and resilience of the Schengen area's external borders**, particularly in light of escalating security threats²⁹. The 2025 Frontex vulnerability assessment showed encouraging results³⁰. The assessment, however, also highlighted that capabilities for migration management at the borders need to be further reinforced in some Member States, including by allocating adequate human resources to perform screening and debriefing. At the same time, ensuring the respect of fundamental rights at the border remains a common challenge, especially in the context of weaponised migration.

Arrivals by sea following search and rescue operations³¹

The number of third-country nationals disembarked in the Union following **search and rescue operations** (SAR) decreased by 36% compared to July 2023-June 2024. From 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025, nearly 97 000 persons were disembarked in the Union following search and rescue operations. **Italy and Spain accounted together for over 80%** of the persons disembarked in the Union.

²⁷ This included cases where non-EU nationals overstayed the permitted 90 days within a 180-day period or lacked a valid visa or residence permit.


²⁸ Ukrainians without valid permits or not covered by temporary protection.

²⁹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 State of Schengen Report, [EUR-Lex - 52025DC0185 - EN - EUR-Lex](#).

³⁰ As reported by Frontex, the total number of identified vulnerabilities concerning the capacities and preparedness of border control in the Member States show a relevant overall downward trend: [The 2025 Vulnerability Assessment brings an encouraging outcome](#).

³¹ The analysis in this section is based on Frontex data.

Figure 2 – Persons disembarked in search and rescue events



Source: JRC elaboration on Frontex data

Providing assistance to any person found in distress at sea is a legal obligation for Member States, established in international as well as Union law³². Attempts to reach the European Union on unseaworthy vessels continued to cause the loss of migrants' lives at sea, with at least 3 000 people reported dead or missing at sea during the reporting period. The Central Mediterranean and the Atlantic route continued to be the deadliest sea routes to the Union³³. Sea crossings in small boats from **France** to the United Kingdom across the **Channel** facilitated by smuggling networks were a significant challenge for the French authorities involved in search and rescue operations. Smuggling networks organised simultaneous departures in overcrowded boats to overwhelm authorities, which resulted in around 7 000 persons disembarked in France following search and rescue operations.

International protection and temporary protection in the Union³⁴

Applications for international protection in the Union decreased by 21% compared to July 2023-June 2024, although they remained overall high with 871 000 applications lodged in the Union. The decrease was mainly driven by fewer irregular arrivals and the sharp decrease in applications by Syrian nationals. **Member States issued 271 000 decisions granting international protection status**³⁵, **a 20% decrease compared to July 2023-June 2024**³⁶. Relative to their GDP and population, **Greece, Austria and Cyprus** were the main Member States granting international protection. In absolute terms, Germany, France and Greece issued most positive decisions on international protection applications, while Spain was the top country granting humanitarian status, mostly to Venezuelans and Colombians.

³² 2020 European Commission recommendation on SAR (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020H1365), especially references under point (5) and (7); European Commission Guidance on the implementation of EU rules on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence ([eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020XC1001\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020XC1001(01))), especially points 4 and 5.


³³ [Data | Missing Migrants Project](#), source: IOM.

³⁴ The analysis on international protection and temporary protection are based on EUAA and Eurostat data, respectively.

³⁵ Includes decisions at first instance and decisions in appeal or review granting Geneva Convention refugee status and subsidiary protection status.

³⁶ The recognition rate at first instance for international protection decreased to 31%, mainly due to fewer positive decisions issued to Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi nationals.

Figure 3 – Applications for international protection by Member States in absolute values, and per capita and GDP³⁷



Source: JRC elaboration on EUAA data and Eurostat data (GDP and population)

Greece and Cyprus received the highest number of applications at Union level in relation to their GDP and population. In absolute numbers, Germany received the highest number of applications for international protection – despite a 40% decrease compared to July 2023-June 2024 – followed by France, Spain and Italy. Venezuelans travelling visa-free in the Union lodged a record number of applications for international protection, mostly in Spain. Afghan nationals applied in lower numbers but were the third nationality applying for asylum. **Applications by unaccompanied minors also decreased by 25% and accounted for 3% of the total.** Relative to GDP and population, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus received most applications by unaccompanied minors at Union level, with Egyptian minors applying in increasing numbers in Greece. In absolute terms, these applications were mostly lodged in Germany, Greece and the Netherlands, and mainly by Syrian and Afghan nationals.

Several Member States temporarily suspended processing of applications by Syrians after the fall of the Assad regime, while Syrians still remained the largest group applying for international protection in the Union, mainly in Germany.

³⁷ Calculated comparing the share of each Member State for this indicator with its share of GDP and population. The share of GDP and population for each Member States is calculated in accordance with the reference key set out in Article 66 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, using Eurostat data.

labour market³⁸. Migrants seeking international protection or joining family members tend to have lower employment rates than labour migrants. In addition, long-term surveys show that asylum seekers achieve labour market outcomes comparable to nationals only after 10 years of residence. Providing adequate housing also remains a challenge: research shows that in 2023 more than one in six migrants in the Union lived in overcrowded accommodation (+70% compared to the native-born population)³⁹. These factors impact negatively on integration outcomes, putting an additional strain on social protection systems and on the functioning of the reception system.

Over 75% of beneficiaries of temporary protection are women and children.

Accommodation and social support varied across Member States. Most Member States started to encourage self-reliance and economic independence, progressively providing more limited support for housing and social benefits, while investing in integration measures. Various measures undertaken by Member States contributed to improved integration in the labour market, although labour market integration for women is still more complicated due to specific barriers⁴⁰. Schooling of displaced children from Ukraine differs and school attendance rates varied, with specific challenges remaining for children with disabilities.

Unauthorised movements within the Union⁴¹

Several Member States faced high numbers of unauthorised movements of migrants and applicants for international protection within the Union. According to the Regulation (EU) 604/2013 (the ‘Dublin III Regulation’)⁴², an applicant for international protection cannot choose the Member State responsible for examining his or her application. Movements from one Member State to another and the deficiencies in implementing Regulation (EU) 604/2013 responsibility rules put a particular strain on the asylum, migration and reception systems of the main destination countries.

Though there are no precise data capturing unauthorised movements, proxy indicators show the scale and direction of these movements within the Union⁴³. The new Eurodac Regulation and database will allow more accurate monitoring of unauthorised movements⁴⁴. For the time

³⁸ Commission Staff Working Document Mid-term review of the Commission Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027 Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions State of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, SWD(2025)162 final, [EUR-Lex - 52025SC0162 - EN - EUR-Lex](#).

³⁹ OECD/European Commission (2023), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/1d5020a6-en>.

⁴⁰ UNHCR, ["A poverty assessment of Ukrainian refugees in neighbouring countries" countries](#), 17 March 2025, p. 14.

⁴¹ The analysis on unauthorised movements is based on EUAA and eu-LISA data.


⁴² Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, [ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/604/oj](#)).

⁴³ Proxy indicators include data collected to monitor the functioning of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 (‘Dublin statistics’) and data stored in Eurodac – the EU’s fingerprint database (established by Regulation (EU) No 603/2013) that stores and compares fingerprints of individuals who have applied for asylum or been apprehended while illegally crossing the external borders of the Schengen area.

⁴⁴ Regulation (EU) 2024/1358 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of biometric data in order to effectively apply Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and

being, available data from Eurodac suggest that **unauthorised movements within the Union decreased by around 25%** compared to July 2023-June 2024⁴⁵, mostly following the overall decrease of irregular arrivals. Despite this decrease, unauthorised movements continued to pose a challenge for the main countries of destination. Unauthorised movements typically took place from countries of first entry in the Union towards Member States in the north-west of the Union. In absolute terms, Greece, Germany, Croatia, Italy and France were the main countries of departure, while Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands were the countries receiving the most unauthorised movements. The main routes registering most unauthorised movements were Greece to Germany, Croatia to Germany, Italy to Germany and Italy to France.

Figure 5 – Map of unauthorised movements based on Eurodac hits (routes with > 6000 hits)⁴⁶



Source: JRC elaboration on EU-LISA data

When complemented with data collected to monitor the functioning of Regulation 604/2013 ('Dublin statistics')⁴⁷, **Slovenia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Croatia and Austria**

(EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 2001/55/EC and to identify illegally staying third-country nationals and stateless persons and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1358/oj>.

⁴⁵ 398 000 foreign Eurodac hits were reported (when both the country of departure and the country of destination are Member States), 27% less than in the July 2023-June 2024 period.

⁴⁶ The map shows the main routes of unauthorised movements as indicated by Eurodac hits. The head of the arrows shows the direction of the movements while width of the arrows reflect the number of hits.

⁴⁷ The number of outgoing take back requests and outgoing take charge requests based on irregular entry and stay was around 93 000 in the reporting period.

were the countries most affected, relative to their GDP and population. A number of Member States are not issuing requests because these often do not lead to a physical transfer of the person. In addition, the implementation rate of transfers remains very low at 19%⁴⁸. Operational and capacity obstacles faced by receiving and transferring Member States also lowered the implementation rate: the lack of sufficient housing, poor material reception conditions and limited early integration opportunities impacted the number of implemented transfers. Germany carried out and received the highest number of transfers, followed by France and the Netherlands. Croatia received by far the highest number of transfers from other Member States compared to its GDP and population. Greece and Italy received a very low number of transfers compared to the number of positive decisions they gave to the requests they received from other Member States⁴⁹.

Increasing the overall number of transfers, resuming transfers towards the Member States that are not accepting transfers, take charge or take back requests, and addressing shortcomings in the national reception system are crucial to ensure the effective functioning of the system, reduce incentives for unauthorised movements and maintain the balance between responsibility and solidarity. While it is expected that the implementation of transfers should significantly improve with the entry into application of the Pact, Member States are expected to fully implement the existing rules without delay.

Reception⁵⁰

Despite considerable efforts to improve data collection on reception, statistics are not fully comparable and remain incomplete. This results in a fragmented picture and prevents a conclusive assessment of the pressure on reception systems⁵¹. Work is ongoing to improve the quality of this data.

Based on the available data⁵², Member States hosted around **1 394 000 people in their national reception systems**, mostly in Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands and Austria. Relative to their GDP and population, **Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and Ireland**⁵³ had the most persons hosted in their reception systems. Beneficiaries of temporary protection who

⁴⁸ The ratio of transfers following accepted requests should be used with caution to assess a Member State's capability to successfully implement transfers due to the lack of cohort data and given that there might be a substantial time lapse between an accepted transfer request and a physical transfer. This time lapse distorts the calculation of the rates if the number of acceptances is not stable over time.

⁴⁹ Data collected to monitor the functioning of Regulation (EU) 604/2013 ('Dublin statistics') include the number of the requests sent and received by a Member State to/from another on take back and take charge procedures, the decisions made on such requests as well as the number of transfer decisions issued and implemented.

⁵⁰ The analysis on reception is based on EUAA data.

⁵¹ The Commission and EUAA set forth an 'incremental approach' by which Member States are required to report reception data at least on two core indicators: persons in the reception system (total number of persons in the reception system, including breakdown per legal status of persons in reception and number of unaccompanied minors); and capacity of the reception system (total beds available at the end of the reporting period). As of 2027, Member States are to report on the whole set of reception indicators.

⁵² This data refers only to the reception system understood as the set of arrangements in place to accommodate applicants for international protection as per the recast Reception Conditions Directive.

⁵³ In Ireland, a significant proportion of international protection applicants entered the country irregularly, principally arriving across the land border of the United Kingdom. This, alongside the significant arrivals of people benefitting from temporary protection, had an impact on the Irish asylum and reception system. During the reporting period, applications for international protection in Ireland stood at 14 000 compared to the unprecedented high numbers in the previous reporting period (18 000). This trend is visible since early 2022, alongside a high number of arrivals from Ukraine.

are provided accommodation support outside this system are not counted in Member States' reporting.

Furthermore, the organisation of reception systems varies across the Union: only some Member States include and collect data on persons with different legal statuses in their reception system, including temporary protection beneficiaries, rejected applicants or persons issued a return order. On this basis, temporary protection beneficiaries accounted for between 50% and 70% of the population hosted in the national reception systems of Austria, Finland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden, while a large number of temporary protection beneficiaries were provided accommodation support outside of this system, notably in **Czechia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania**.

The overall occupancy rate in the national reception systems in the Union was 81% at the end of June 2025⁵⁴. Ensuring sufficient capacity and adequate reception conditions is a key element of a well-prepared asylum, reception and migration system and for the well-functioning of the responsibility rules under Regulation (EU) 604/2013. Several Member States faced challenges in ensuring sufficient capacity in their national reception systems⁵⁵, while at the same time, some Member States, in view of the limited number of applicants, have decreased their accommodation capacity, including Finland, Denmark and Sweden.

Resettlement and humanitarian admission⁵⁶

Fourteen Member States made pledges under the ad-hoc Union resettlement and humanitarian admission scheme for 2024-2025. Nearly 12 000 persons arrived in the Union through these pathways during the reporting period. More than half of the beneficiaries were resettled in **Germany and France**, while **Finland and Sweden resettled the most beneficiaries relative to their GDP and population**. The volatile situation in the Middle East, notably in Lebanon and in Syria, had an impact on resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes: the numbers of admitted persons decreased in all reporting Member States but the Netherlands and Sweden. Syria was by far the main country of origin of admitted people, followed by Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Eritrea.

Return⁵⁷

Between July 2024 and June 2025, Member States issued, in total, 478 000 orders to leave to third-country nationals in the Union, **an increase of 11% compared to July 2023-June 2024, mostly driven by more orders to leave being issued together with negative asylum decisions**. Most orders were issued by France, Spain and Germany, while, relative to its GDP and population, **Cyprus** issued by far the most orders to leave, followed by **Greece and Croatia**. The nationalities of third-country nationals issued an order to leave differed significantly across Member States⁵⁸.

⁵⁴ At the end of June 2025, it was possible to calculate the occupancy rate for 25 Member States. The data needed for the calculation of the occupancy rate were incomplete for Finland and Portugal.


⁵⁵ This is the case for Belgium, Cyprus, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece.

⁵⁶ The analysis on resettlement and humanitarian admission is based on EUAA data.

⁵⁷ The analysis on return is based on Eurostat data.

⁵⁸ France issued most orders to leave to nationals of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco; Spain to nationals of Mali, Senegal and Algeria, and Germany to nationals of Syria, Türkiye and Afghanistan. Cyprus issued most orders to leave to nationals of Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, Greece to nationals of Afghanistan, Syria and Albania, and Croatia to nationals of Türkiye, Nepal and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure 6 – Number of return orders and third country nationals returned per Member State



Source: JRC elaboration on Eurostat data

115 000 illegally staying third-country nationals were effectively returned to a third country. Over half of the returns were implemented by only five Member States (Germany, France, Sweden, Cyprus and Poland). This represents a 20% increase compared to July 2023-June 2024. However, **the overall return rate remains low, resulting in a backlog of persons with an order to leave remaining in the Union territory**⁵⁹. Most nationals ordered to leave were nationals of Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Türkiye and Afghanistan, with Syrians increasing by 14%. The main nationalities of those returned were nationals of Georgia, Türkiye, Albania, Moldova and Colombia. This shows that the countries ranking highest in terms of third-country nationals ordered to leave do not correspond to the countries with the highest number of implemented returns, with the exception of Türkiye. More than half of all returns were voluntary, following an increasing trend. While sustained efforts on readmission through the Article 25a Visa Code mechanism and the EU Return Coordinator's targeted actions on priority third countries have already delivered results, notably with key third countries such as Bangladesh, Iraq and Ethiopia⁶⁰, **specific obstacles continue to hamper returns**. It remains crucial that Member States follow up return orders with readmission requests to the relevant third countries and systematically request emergency travel documents for persons with

⁵⁹ The EU-wide return rate stood at 24% during the reporting period.

⁶⁰ The mechanism of Article 25a Visa Code contributed to triggering favourable dynamics and concrete progress with third countries. The return rate for Bangladesh increased from 9% in 2023 to 17% in 2024, the one for Iraq from 14% to 31%. Also, in the case of Ethiopia where visa measures were adopted in April 2024, the return rate increased in 2024 (13%, compared to 11% in 2023), along with improved Member State activity in requesting Ethiopia to readmit its citizens (more than four times as many readmission requests in 2024 compared to 2023). Targeted return actions on priority third countries initiated by the EU Return Coordinator brought focus and coherence across EU level actions exceeding the 25% growth target with several third countries.

confirmed nationality⁶¹. The 2024 thematic Schengen evaluation identified progress in developing national return systems, while inefficiencies remain in key stages of the process⁶², having an impact on unauthorised movements, as shown by the return alerts within the Schengen Information System (SIS)⁶³.

Continued efforts are needed to create a common Union system for returns, combined with more effective cooperation with third countries. The proposed Return Regulation⁶⁴ will be instrumental in addressing these issues and in ensuring that returns can contribute to the overall objectives of the Union migration and asylum policy. The European Parliament and the Council are invited to proceed with the swift adoption of this reform.

b. Projection for the coming year and information on the level of preparedness in the Union

The **Solidarity Pool** proposed by the Commission aims to address the needs of Member States identified as being under migratory pressure in the Commission Decision. As per Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, in identifying those needs, the Commission should consider the main findings of this Report, including both the impact of past trends on the Member States concerned, and the projection for the coming year⁶⁵. This strategic picture serves as an early warning tool for the Union, helps to anticipate possible developments in the migratory situation and determine how these could affect the needs of Member States under migratory pressure and the Union as a whole.

The projection builds on a methodology developed by the scientific service of the Commission – the Joint Research Centre (JRC) – and it was tested with the EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint Network.

The projection suggests that, overall, **irregular arrivals at Union level are expected to decrease across all the main migratory routes in 2026 compared to 2024**⁶⁶, in line with the downward trend already observed in the first half of 2025. The expected decrease results, among other factors, from strong Union engagement with key countries of origin and transit, reinforced asylum and border protection systems, and intensified action against migrant smuggling networks both within the Union and in third countries. The **Central Mediterranean route** is expected to remain the most active route, yet overall numbers are projected to stabilise

⁶¹ According to data reported by Frontex, Member States submitted less requests for identification and emergency travel documents (-6%, 68 908 compared to 73 449 in the previous reporting period).

⁶² This includes challenges in ensuring a smooth return process due to inefficiencies at key stages, including the appeals system, effective pre-return identification and sufficient monitoring of the compliance with an obligation to return. The 2024 thematic Schengen evaluation also showed that the operational implementation of return alerts within the Schengen Information System, by all national authorities, needs to be enhanced to achieve more effective decision-making in return procedures.

⁶³ During the reporting period, nearly 54 600 people subject to SIS return alerts were identified in Member States other than the one that created the alert (“SIS hits”). Of these, around 33 600 were third-country nationals detected at checks within the territory, while about 16 500 were intercepted at border checks when leaving the EU through a Member State other than the one that had issued the alert.

⁶⁴ COM (2025) 101 final.

⁶⁵ SWD(2025) 791, "Projection pursuant to Article 9(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the year 2026", classified as “RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED”.

⁶⁶ As the data for the full year 2025 is not available at the time of the adoption of the Report, the 2024 data is used as the most recent and complete annual reference point to contextualise the projection for the coming year 2026. The trend observed in 2025, however, has been fully taken into account in the analysis.

or decline further compared to 2024. This trend reflects the impact of reinforced cooperation with partner countries in North Africa and the broader region. A similar dynamic is expected for the **Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes**, where the strong efforts to monitor departure points and dismantle smuggling networks are delivering results. On the **Eastern Mediterranean route**, developments will largely depend on the evolving situation in the Middle East, including newly emerged sub-routes, yet the overall outlook points towards a continuation of the downward trend that started already in late 2024, shaped by shifting regional dynamics and a lower presence of certain nationalities. Along the **Western Balkan route**, arrivals are also expected to decrease, supported by more effective dismantling of smuggling networks and enhanced cooperation between the region and Member States and Union Agencies. On the **Eastern Border route**, Russia and Belarus are likely to continue their attempts to weaponise migration against the Union; however, strengthened border management is expected to further reduce illegal crossings. Finally, the situation of illegal exits across the **Channel route** is expected to remain challenging, although national measures in France and further engagement with the United Kingdom are expected to contain or decrease departures.

The **downward trend for applications for international protection** observed in 2024 and the first half of 2025 is expected to continue in 2026.

As regards temporary protection, Russia's ongoing indiscriminate war of aggression against Ukraine will continue to generate **protection needs for Ukrainian nationals** in 2026. Registrations for temporary protection will persist, but at lower levels than in previous years.

As migration dynamics remain inherently uncertain, efforts to strengthen **preparedness and contingency planning** in the Member States and in the Union remain crucial. Adequate contingency planning is an important component of the **well-prepared asylum, reception and migration system** as it enhances the resilience and preparedness to respond quickly and effectively to changes in the migratory situation, while ensuring the respect of individual rights and needs.

Obligations on **contingency planning** are embedded into Union legislation⁶⁷. While most Member States have contingency plans in place in different areas of migration management, gaps remain. Overall, the level of preparedness in the Union and in the Member States on migration management benefits from the implementation of the new provisions introduced in the Pact. Almost all Member States adopted and notified their national contingency plans on reception and asylum to the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)⁶⁸, albeit with different levels of completeness (more details in the Annex). Since 2019, Member States need

⁶⁷ Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; Directive (EU) 2024/1346 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection; Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 (OJ L, 2024/1359, 22.5.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1359/oj>); Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, pp. 1–131, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj>); Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 (OJ L 468, 30.12.2021, pp. 1–54, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2303/oj>).

⁶⁸ Except for Hungary and Poland.

to develop and adopt a national **contingency plan for border management and return**⁶⁹. The results of the vulnerability assessment conducted by Frontex for 2024 show that most Member States report having relevant contingency plans in place on border management, although some gaps exist, as also underscored by the Schengen evaluations. In addition, the 2024 thematic evaluation on the effectiveness of returns revealed significant gaps in national contingency planning, with most Member States lacking dedicated contingency plans for return operations despite this requirement set out in Article 9(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard.

At Union level, the Union Agencies are prepared to provide operational support to Member States in case of sudden increases in migratory flows. The EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint Network, chaired by the Commission, continues to play a key role in providing a common situational picture, early warning and forecasting in support of better preparedness. The Network hosts a dedicated subgroup on contingency planning.

IV. Assessment of the overall migratory situation, migratory pressure, risk of migratory pressure or significant migratory situation

Based on the information presented in this Report, the Commission assessed which Member States faced disproportionate obligations, taking into account the overall migratory situation in the Union. At the same time, the Commission is proposing to the Council the total numbers of solidarity contributions for the Solidarity Pool at Union level necessary to address the migratory situation in the upcoming year in a balanced and effective manner.

Considering the trends outlined in this Report for the reference period from July 2024 to June 2025 and the methodology, the Commission Decision determined that, when all the relevant quantitative and qualitative data and information are aggregated and assessed in relation to the overall situation in the Union, **Greece** and **Cyprus** are under migratory pressure. In addition, the Commission Decision determined that **Italy** and **Spain** are under migratory pressure because of a large number of arrivals due to recurring disembarkations following search and rescue ('SAR') operations, that are of such a scale that they create disproportionate obligations in relation to the overall situation in the Union on even a well-prepared asylum, reception and migration system of the Member State concerned.

While trends remained overall stable compared to July 2023-June 2024, **Greece** faced disproportionate obligations in relation to the overall situation in the Union, in particular due to the number of IBCs (over 60 000) and applications for international protection (over 70 000). These were the highest recorded at Union level relative to GDP and population. Greece also recorded the highest number, relative to GDP and population, of decisions granting international protection, reaching nearly 32 000 between July 2024 and June 2025. Relative to its GDP and population, Greece was second for numbers of orders to leave (over 30 000), but only 5 400 third-country nationals were returned in the period under analysis.

While the migration and asylum situation improved compared to July 2023-June 2024, **Cyprus** still faced disproportionate obligations in relation to the overall situation in the Union, in particular due to IBCs, applications for international protection and registrations for temporary

⁶⁹ Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, pp. 1–131; ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj>).

protection. While IBCs (nearly 3 000) decreased significantly, the number of arrivals still put a strain on Cyprus' asylum and migration system as Cyprus ranked among the top three countries in the Union relative to GDP and population for IBCs. Cyprus also received the second highest number of applications for international protection (more than 5 000) in the Union relative to GDP and population. Similarly, Cyprus received a significant number of registrations for temporary protection (around 3 500) in relation to the country's GDP and population. Furthermore, while the number of third-country nationals ordered to leave (close to 16 000) remained stable compared to July 2023-June 2024, twice as many third-country nationals were returned following an order to leave (close to 10 000) compared to July 2023-June 2024 (nearly 5 000).

In **Italy** and **Spain**, the share and absolute number of arrivals due to recurring disembarkations following SAR operations were of such a scale that they created disproportionate obligations on these countries compared to the overall situation in the Union, as over 80% of the almost 97 000 persons assisted in SAR operations were disembarked in these two Member States (around 40% each).

These four Member States will therefore have **access to the Solidarity Pool** when Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 enters into application.

In order to ensure the balance between solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility and to safeguard the functioning of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, Article 60(3) of that Regulation establishes that contributing Member States are not required to implement their solidarity pledges towards a benefitting Member State where the Commission has identified **systemic shortcomings** in that benefitting Member State with regard to the responsibility rules set out in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 that could result in serious negative consequences for the functioning of that Regulation.

Part III of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 sets out, inter alia, the obligations of the Member State responsible to take charge of and take back applicants and third-country nationals whose application for international protection was registered in another Member State or in relation to whom another Member State was indicated as responsible under Regulation (EU) 2024/1358, including to carry out the transfers of those persons, with full respect of the applicant's fundamental rights within the meaning of the Charter. These rules are in continuity with the rules of the Dublin III Regulation and will replace them as of their entry into application.

The Commission will assess by 12 July 2026 and again by 15 October 2026 the application of the responsibility rules by the Member States and apply Article 60(3), fourth sub-paragraph of Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, if systemic shortcomings are identified in a Member State. In this assessment, particular attention will be paid to the level of cooperation among Member States, including the active engagement to facilitate transfers and progressive cooperation on practical and logistical matters.

Based on the findings of this Report and the methodology, having considered all the relevant quantitative and qualitative data and information and having assessed them in relation to the overall situation in the Union, the Decision also determined **Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Finland** to be at risk of migratory pressure.

Between July 2024 and June 2025, **Bulgaria** and **Croatia**, as countries of first entry, continued to be particularly exposed to the fluctuations in migratory flows along the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean routes. A significant increase of irregular arrivals during the year could lead to their already strained migration and asylum systems to be affected by disproportionate obligations. Although **Bulgaria** recorded a decrease in the number of applications for international protection compared to July 2023-June 2024, it still registered nearly 10 000 applications for international protection, a significant number relative to its GDP and population. One fifth of these applications were lodged by unaccompanied minors, making Bulgaria the second Member State receiving applications by unaccompanied minors at Union level relative to GDP and population. Bulgaria also registered a high and steady number of registrations for temporary protection relative to its share of GDP and population (among the top five Member States) with over 21 000 new registrations in July 2024-June 2025. **Croatia**, between July 2024 and June 2025, was impacted by IBCs and refusals of entry. Croatia recorded more than 12 000 IBCs, which represented 76% of the overall irregular arrivals along the Western Balkans route and the second highest number of IBCs in the Union relative to GDP and population. Croatia also accounted for a similar number of refusals of entry, the highest at Union level relative to GDP and population.

At the same time, a number of Member States recorded high numbers of unauthorised movements which put particular pressure on their asylum, migration and reception systems. The challenges associated with such unauthorised movements are addressed by acknowledging the possibility of applying **responsibility offsets** to these cases as part of the solidarity contributions.

Between July 2024 and June 2025, **Germany** received a significantly high number of unauthorised movements of applicants for international protection in the Union, resulting in a large number of applications for international protection, which impacted its asylum and reception system. This was further compounded not only by the hosting of the highest number of temporary protection beneficiaries in the EU but also due to a very high number of applications for international protection in the last ten years. **France** also received a high number of unauthorised movements of applicants for international protection within the Union and faced increasing illegal border crossings on exit towards the United Kingdom, which impacted the national asylum and reception system. **The Netherlands** and **Belgium** were also impacted by unauthorised movements of applicants for international protection, which put a strain on the reception systems. **Ireland** has also experienced a sustained high number of applications for international protection and a significant proportion enter the country irregularly, principally arriving across the land border of the United Kingdom. This, together with the significant arrivals of persons benefitting from temporary protection, had an impact on the national asylum and reception system.

As outlined in section III, actions by Russia and Belarus continue to influence migratory dynamics at the Union Eastern border, especially in **Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland**. Hybrid threats linked to the weaponisation of migration continue to raise serious migration and security risks, adding to occasional violent incidents and attempts to cross the border. In response to continued state-sponsored attempts to weaponise migration, Estonia strengthened border management measures at the border with Russia; Latvia and Lithuania strengthened surveillance measures at their border with Belarus; Poland established a buffer zone along its border and temporarily limits the right to apply for international protection at

that border, except for vulnerable groups; Finland closed its crossing points with Russia in November 2023. Further attempts by Russia and Belarus to weaponise migration could put additional strain on national border protection systems, which may lead to disproportionate obligations.

These twelve Member States at risk of migratory pressure will have **priority access to the Permanent EU Migration Support Toolbox**. At the same time, should the situation in these Member States deteriorate, the Commission will be ready, in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, to re-evaluate their situation in an expedited manner.

Based on the Report and the methodology, the Commission Decision also determined that **Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Austria, and Poland** are facing a significant migratory situation, due to the cumulative effect of the quantitative and qualitative data and information aggregated and assessed during the last five-year period (1 July 2020 to 30 June 2025).

In **Bulgaria**, for the last five years and especially since 2022, relative to its share of GDP and population, the inflow of registrations for temporary protection, together with a relative high number of applications for international protection, put a strain on the system, in particular as Bulgaria issued a significant number of positive decisions and rejections, in relative terms, that created a relative high burden on the return system. In **Croatia**, over the previous five years, the strain on the return system, relative to its share of GDP and population, had a major impact on the country's capacities in addition to the obligations faced at its external border, notably as Croatia issued in relative terms a large number of refusals of entry and has experienced more recently a relative high number of IBCs due to increased migrant smuggling activities in the region.

Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, **Poland** and **Czechia** have recorded among the highest number of temporary protection registrations in the Union relative to their GDP and population. This has created integration challenges and has put a significant strain on the migration, asylum and border management systems of those Member States since 2022. Relative to its GDP and population, **Estonia** has recorded a high number of temporary protection registrations, combined with a significant number of applications for international protection that resulted in high number of positive decisions in the last five years.

During the last five-year period, **Austria** received a high number of applications for international protection. While this number has decreased between July 2024 and June 2025 compared to the previous 12-months period, the overall number of applications for international protection, and the resulting number of positive decisions, over the five-year period has had a cumulative effect on the capacity of its migration, reception and asylum system.

These Member States will have the possibility to **request from the Council a full or partial deduction** of their solidarity contributions for the upcoming year.

V. Conclusion

The steady progress in the implementation of all the components of the Pact at national and Union level, the downward trend of irregular arrivals and the projection for the coming year, together with the positive results of the continuous work with partner countries set a solid basis for an orderly, fair and firm management of migration and asylum.

By making full use of the new legal and operational framework of the Pact, further progress can be achieved to lower pressure on the Member States, reduce unauthorised movements, increase overall efficiency, reduce backlogs, and ease the burden on the administrative and operational structures of the Member States. At the same time, some challenges remain regarding the implementation of the Pact, and the Commission, together with the relevant Union Agencies, will continue to provide support to Member States.

A swift adoption of the Commission pending proposals, including on a Common European System for Returns and a Union list of safe countries of origin can support our efforts. The Commission will pursue its work to strengthen comprehensive partnerships with partner countries, engaging strategically at regional and global level and developing smart cross-policy leverages to promote better cooperation on migration.

In terms of implementation of the Pact, solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility need to continue advancing together and in a balanced way. The start of the first Annual Migration Management Cycle is an important step to prepare the ground for the operationalisation of the new solidarity mechanism. Based on the Report, the Commission Decision and the Commission proposal for a Council implementing Decision establishing the Annual Solidarity Pool, the Council should convene, within 15 days, the High-Level EU Solidarity Forum in view of agreeing on the size of the Solidarity Pool and on how each Member State will contribute. The Commission stands ready to support the Council throughout this process. The EU Solidarity Coordinator will also convene the Technical-Level EU Solidarity Forum to operationalise the solidarity mechanism between the Member States and address the solidarity needs with the contributions identified, ahead of the entry into application in mid-2026.

The Commission will report again in March 2026 on the progress in the implementation of the Pact ahead of the entry into application. The Commission will also develop a long-term European asylum and migration management strategy, setting out a high-level policy and operational roadmap for a common system that is robust and adaptable to the rapidly changing circumstances.